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GROKSTER GOATS: RECKONING THE FUTURE 
BUSINESS PLANS OF COPYRIGHT-DEPENDENT 
TECHNOLOGY ENTREPRENEURS 
Jane C. Ginsburg* 
Abstract 
U.S. and many other national copyright systems 
have by statute or caselaw (or both) established rules 
engaging or excusing liability for facilitating (or, in 
commonwealth countries, “authorizing”) copyright 
infringement. Taken as a group, they share a goal of 
insulating the innovator whose technology happens, but was 
not intended, to enable its adopters to make unlawful copies 
or communications of protected works. The more 
infringement becomes integrated into the innovator’s 
business plan, however, the less likely the entrepreneur is to 
persuade a court of the neutrality of its venture. The US 
Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in MGM v Grokster, 
established that businesses built from the start on inducing 
infringement will be held liable; judges will frown on 
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drawing one’s start-up capital from other people’s 
copyrights. Thus, the inferences entrepreneurs may draw 
from the Court’s elucidation of the elements of inducement 
may advise pro-active measures to prevent infringement 
from becoming a business asset. As a result, even businesses 
not initially built on infringement, but in which infringement 
comes to play an increasingly profitable part, may find 
themselves liable unless they take good faith measures to 
forestall infringements. 
This article addresses the evolution of the U.S.’s 
judge-made rules of secondary liability for copyright 
infringement, and the possible emergence of an obligation 
of good faith efforts to avoid infringement. The recent 
announcements of inter-industry “Principles for User 
Generated Content Services” and of complementary “Fair 
Use Principles for User-Generated Video Content” suggest 
that proactive avoidance measures may become a matter of 
“best practice.” The article then turns to the statutory 
regime of safe harbors established for certain Internet 
service providers and considers whether the statute 
insulates entrepreneurs who would have been held 
derivatively liable under common law norms. Finally, the 
article compares the U.S. developments with recent French 
decisions holding the operators of “user-generated content” 
and “social networking” websites liable for their 
customers’ unauthorized posting of copyrighted works. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
With the evolution of digital communications, the means of reproducing 
and disseminating copyrighted works increasingly leave the control of copyright 
owners and commercial distribution intermediaries.  Websites and peer-to-peer and 
other technologies allow members of the public to originate the public 
communication of works of authorship. This does not mean that dissemination 
intermediaries have vanished from the copyright landscape, but rather that we have 
new kinds of intermediaries, who do not themselves distribute copyrighted content, 
but give their customers the means to make works available to the public.  
When the works thus offered are neither of the distributor’s own creation, 
nor distributed with the creator’s permission, the person making the works 
available is a copyright infringer (assuming no exception, such as fair use, 
applies).1 But the principal economic actor in this scenario is not likely to be the 
                                                 
1 The exclusive rights listed in the US Copyright Act, 17 USC § 106, do not explicitly 
include a “making available” right, cf. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 8 (obliging member 
states – of which the US is one -- to implement a making available right). The WCT defines 
the right in terms similar to the US right of public performance by transmission, 17 USC 
§101; if what is made available is a file transfer rather than a rendering of a performance, 
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member of the public effecting the distribution. Rather, it is the entrepreneur who 
intentionally facilitated the distribution, for example, by operating a website to 
which members of the public could post the works, or by targeting search services 
to locations where the works can be found, or by distributing file-sharing software 
designed to enable unauthorized copying and communication of works. 
Meaningful copyright enforcement will seek to establish the liability of the 
entrepreneurs.2  
But all the technologies just evoked are “dual purpose,” that is, they are 
not inherently pernicious; they can in fact be put to perfectly lawful and socially 
desirable uses. If the technology itself is at least in theory neutral, does this pose an 
insoluble quandary: either enforce copyright at the expense of technological 
evolution, or promote technology at the cost of copyright? Or can we have it both 
ways, fostering both authorship and technological innovation? To reach that happy 
medium, we need to ensure the “neutrality” of the technology as applied in a given 
business setting. If the entrepreneur isn’t neutral, and is in fact building its 
business at the expense of authors and right owners, it should not matter how 
anodyne in the abstract the technology may be. 
US and many other national copyright systems have by statute or caselaw 
(or both) established rules engaging or excusing liability for facilitating (or, in 
commonwealth countries, “authorizing”) copyright infringement. Taken as a 
group, they share a goal of insulating the innovator whose technology happens, but 
was not intended, to enable its adopters to make unlawful copies or 
communications of protected works. The more infringement becomes integrated 
into the innovator’s business plan, however, the less likely the entrepreneur is (or 
should be) to persuade a court of the neutrality of its venture. The US Supreme 
Court’s 2005 decision in MGM v Grokster,3 established that businesses built from 
the start on inducing infringement will be held liable; judges will frown on 
drawing one’s start-up capital from other people’s copyrights.4 Thus, the 
                                                                                                                
the making available right is probably covered by § 106(3)’s right to distribute the work in 
copies or phonorecords.  
2 As Judge Posner bluntly stated in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 
645-46 (7th Cir. 2003), “The [digital file]swappers, who are ignorant or more commonly 
disdainful of copyright and in any event discount the likelihood of being sued or prosecuted 
for copyright infringement, are the direct infringers. But firms that facilitate their 
infringement, even if they are not themselves infringers because they are not making copies 
of the music that is shared, may be liable to the copyright owners as contributory infringers. 
Recognizing the impracticability or futility of a copyright owner’s suing a multitude of 
individual infringers (‘chasing individual consumers is time consuming and is a teaspoon 
solution to an ocean problem,’ Randal C. Picker, ‘Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of 
Digital Distribution,’ 47 Antitrust Bull. 423, 442 (2002)), the law allows a copyright holder 
to sue a contributor to the infringement instead, in effect as an aider and abettor.” 
3 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
4 See Transcript of Oral Argument, at 36, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913 (2005), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-480.pdf . 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- but what you have -- what you want to do is to say that 
unlawfully expropriated property can be used by the owner of the instrumentality as part of 
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inferences entrepreneurs may draw from the Court’s elucidation of the elements of 
inducement may advise pro-active measures to prevent infringement from 
becoming a business asset. As a result, even businesses not initially built on 
infringement, but in which infringement comes to play an increasingly profitable 
part, may find themselves liable unless they take good faith measures to forestall 
infringements. 
I will address the evolution of the U.S.’s judge-made rules of secondary 
liability for copyright infringement, and the possible emergence of an obligation of 
good faith efforts to avoid infringement. The recent announcement of inter-
industry “Principles for User Generated Content Services,” suggests that proactive 
avoidance measures may become a matter of “best practice.”5 I then will turn to 
the statutory regime of safe harbors established for certain Internet service 
providers and will consider whether the statute insulates entrepreneurs who would 
have been held derivatively liable under common law norms. Finally, I will 
compare the U.S. developments with three recent French decisions holding the 
operators of “user-generated content” and “social networking” websites liable for 
their customers’ unauthorized posting of copyrighted works. 
I. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
Copyright infringement is a tort.6 So is intentionally enabling or inciting 
another to infringe. Decisions dating back several decades recognize two bases of 
derivative liability, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability. As the 
Supreme Court in Grokster summarized, “One infringes contributorily by 
intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously 
by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or 
                                                                                                                
the startup capital for his product. 
MR. TARANTO: I -- well – 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: And I -- just from an economic standpoint and a legal 
standpoint, that sounds wrong to me 
5 http://www.ugcprinciples.com/ The initial signatories are the major studios (CBS, 
Disney, Fox, NBC-Universal, Viacom) and Microsoft, and some user-generated sites: 
MySpace, VeOh, Daily Motion. Google (You Tube) is noticeably absent. The Principles 
have not reaped uniform praise; early reactions from the blogosphere branded the document 
as “putrid” and a “frontal attack on Internet freedom,” (Russell Shaw 10/18/07, at 
http://blogs.zdnet.com/ip-telephony/?p=2596), and a concoction of “Big Content” that goes 
“above and beyond the requirements of the DMCA” [for reasons explained infra, this 
assertion is questionable] and is “all but certain to give fair use short shrift,” (Eric 
Bangerman, 10/18/07, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071018-consortiums-user-
generated-content-principles-extend-far-beyond-fair-use.html ). A coalition of groups, 
including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, have proposed complementary “Fair Use 
Principles for User Generated Video Content,” see http://www.eff.org/issues/ip-and-free-
speech/fair-use-principles-usergen These do not, however, denounce pre-upload filtering 
per se, rather they advocate a wide berth for fair use, for example, through prompt 
notification to users, to allow them to contest any blocking, see Fair Use Principle 2b. 
6 See Latman & Tager, Innocent Infringement of Copyright, 2 Studies on Copyright 
139 (Fisher Mem. Ed. 1963). 
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limit it.”7 In addition, one who supplies the means to infringe and knows of the use 
to which the means will be put (or turns a blind eye) can be held liable for 
contributory infringement.8 In the early cases the relationship between the supplier 
and the user of the means was sufficiently close that there could be little doubt of 
either the knowledge or the nexus between the means and the infringement.9 For 
example, in the ‘make-a-tape’ case, a record shop rented phonorecords to 
customers who would also purchase blank tape and then use a recording machine 
on the store premises to copy the rented recording onto the blank tape.10 The store 
owner’s knowledge of the likely use of the blank tape was patent. When, however, 
the infringement-facilitating device leaves the direct control of the facilitator, so 
that he no longer knows in fact what his customers are up to, contributory 
infringement may be more difficult to establish. That, in essence, was the 
copyright owners’ problem in the ‘Betamax’ case.11 Sony, the distributor of the 
video tape recorder, could well anticipate that consumers would use the record 
function to copy protected programs, but once the device was out of the 
manufacturer’s hands, it could neither know precisely what the end users were 
doing, nor limit their use to permissible copying. 
In absolving Sony of liability, the U.S. Supreme Court borrowed from the 
patent staute to add a gloss to the prior standard: one who distributes an 
infringement-enabling device will not be liable for the ensuing infringements if the 
device is “widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed it need 
merely be capable of substantial non infringing uses.”12 This was so even though 
                                                 
7 545 U.S. at 930.  For detailed analysis of the tort law bases for secondary liability in 
copyright law, see Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Liability After Grokster, 16 Info. & Comm. 
Tech. L. 233 (2007). 
8 See generally Goldstein on Copyright Section 8.1 (3d edition 2005) (citing cases). 
9 See id. (advancing the general proposition that ‘the closer the defendant’s acts are to 
the infringing activity, the stronger will be the inference that the defendant knew of the 
activity’). 
10 Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronic Distributors, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973). See also RCA Records v A-Fast Systems, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335 (SDNY 
1984) (defendant’s employees used ‘Rezound’ cassette recorder to make copies of sound 
recordings on customers’ request); A&M Records v General Audio Video Cassettes, 948 F. 
Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (sale of custom-length blank tape timed to correspond to 
particular sound recordings). 
11 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
12 464 U.S. at 442.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c): 
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United 
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, 
or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a 
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially 
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity 
of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer. 
Some copyright scholars have criticized Sony’s engrafting onto the copyright law of 
the patent law “staple article of commerce” standard, see, e.g., Peter Menell and David 
Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 Cal L Rev 941 (2007), but many support it, see, e.g., Brief of 
the Amici Curiae of Sixty Intellectual Property and Technology Law Professors and US-
ACM Public Policy Committee, to the U.S. Supreme Court in MGM v. Grokster, 20 
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the distributor was aware that at least some of the use to which the device would 
be put would be infringing. The court then held that time-shifting (recording for 
subsequent viewing and then erasure) of free broadcast television programs was a 
fair use.13 On the record in the case, the “primary use” of the VTR was for time-
shifting.14 Thus, the VTR was more than “merely capable” of substantial non 
infringing use; the majority of its actual uses were held not to infringe.  The Sony 
facts as a result do not help us determine whether a minority non infringing use 
would nonetheless be “substantial.” 
The Sony “substantial non infringing use” standard did not again come 
into play with respect to mass-market means of copying until the Napster 
controversy.15 There, an online peer-to-peer music sharing service maintained a 
central database that allowed end users to find other users currently online and to 
copy MP3 files from their hard drives. Napster invoked the Sony standard, 
asserting that not all the files were copied without authorization. Napster also 
asserted that peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture could in the future spawn more non 
infringing uses. The Ninth Circuit agreed that Sony required taking into account 
the service’s capacity for future lawful use but nonetheless held Napster a 
contributory infringer. In yet another gloss on the standard of liability, the Napster 
court held that courts should inquire into non infringing uses when the distributor 
of the device lacks actual knowledge of and control over specific infringements. 
Where, however, it is possible to segregate and prevent infringing uses, it is not 
appropriate to exculpate the entire system by virtue of its capacity for non 
infringing uses. In other words, the consequences to technology of enforcing 
copyright rules were different in Sony and in Napster. Sony presented the court 
with an all-or-nothing challenge: either the device would be enjoined, frustrating 
legitimate uses, or no liability would attach, despite the infringements the device 
enabled. In Napster, by contrast, the service could disable infringing uses by 
blocking access to listings of protected files, while allowing permissible uses to 
                                                                                                                
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 535 (2005). 
13 Id. at 447-56. 
14 Id. at 493 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
15 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). But see Vault v. 
Quaid Software, 874 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (distributor of program designed to 
circumvent software copyright protection held not liable for contributory infringement 
because program could be used for non infringing purpose of making back up copies 
authorized by 17 USC Section 117). One reason that the courts were not confronted with the 
Sony standard for such a long period may be that copyright defendants were hesitant to rely 
on it. See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright 
Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 
143, 201-02 (2007) (arguing that “the market does not put a lot of faith in Sony’s staple 
article of commerce safe harbor”). Alternatively, and on the contrary, the paucity of 
litigation applying or challenging the Sony standard may reflect an inter-industry 
recognition that Sony represented the status quo, see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The 
Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 
Fordham L. Rev. 1831, 1850 (2006), citing Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 917, 930 (2005) (“Sony has been characterized as the "Magna Carta" of the 
information technology industry”). 
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continue. Napster thus transformed Sony into an inquiry into knowledge of and 
ability to prevent specific infringements.16 
Of course, the Napster rule set out the instructions for its own demise: if 
Napster was liable because it could maintain control over its users’ activities, then 
the next device or service would be sure to make it difficult, if not impossible, for 
the service to exercise control.17 So were born the P2P file-sharing enterprise 
Kazaa, and its U.S. licensees, Grokster and Morpheus. Unlike Napster, these 
services had no centralized directory: they dispersed information about file 
location across computer ‘nodes’ around the world. Users could find each other, 
but the services disclaimed the ability to prevent infringements as they were 
occurring. In the Grokster case, songwriters, record producers and motion picture 
producers alleged that the Grokster and Streamcast (dba Morpheus) file-sharing 
networks should be held liable for facilitating the commission of massive amounts 
of copyright infringement by the end-users who employed the defendants’ P2P 
software to copy and redistribute films and sound recordings to each others’ hard 
drives. Although it recognized that Grokster and Morpheus had intentionally built 
their systems to defeat copyright enforcement, the Ninth Circuit held that without 
the ability to prevent specific infringements, the services could not be liable.18 The 
court scarcely considered whether the services enabled substantial non infringing 
use; it acknowledged that 90% of the uses were infringing, but observed in  a 
footnote that 10% could be substantial, particularly when the 10% referenced 
many millions of uses. (That the other 90% would be even more extensive seems 
not to have troubled the court.)19 
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed. It held that the Ninth Circuit 
had misapplied the Sony standard, or, more accurately, that the Ninth Circuit did 
not appreciate that the Sony standard does not even come into play when the 
defendant is “actively inducing” copyright infringement. That is, a device might 
well be capable of substantial non infringing uses. But if it can be shown that the 
distributor intended users to employ the device in order to infringe copyright, then 
the distributor will be liable as a matter of basic tort principles.20 In this light, Sony 
was a case articulating a standard for assessing liability when it cannot be shown 
                                                 
16 For a criticism of the Ninth Circuit’s approach, see Goldstein, supra, at Section 
8.1.2. 
17 See, e.g., Fred Von Lohmann, IAAL: Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Copyright Law 
after Napster (2001), available at http://www.gtamarketing.com/P2Panalyst/VonLohmann-
article.html 
Disabling oneself from aiding copyright enforcement, however, runs the risk of being 
characterized as “willful blindness,” see In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th 
Cir.2003) (Posner, J.). 
18 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d., 
545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
19 See 380 F.3d at 1162 n.10. 
20 545 U.S. at 934-35.  The Court also observed that the patent statute’s staple article of 
commerce defense does not “extend to those who induce patent infringement, § 271(b),” id. 
n. 10.  The Court had previously applied an inducement test to determine contributory 
liability for trademark infringement, see Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 854 
(1982).  Unlike Sony, Inwood Laboratories did not purport to draw guidance from the 
patent act. 
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that the device distributor sought to foster infringement. But if the defendant has, 
through “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct”21 actively induced 
infringement, there is no need to revisit the Sony standard in order to clarify what 
“substantial non infringing use” actually means.  
The Court set out three “features” probative of intent to induce 
infringement: (1) the defendant promoted the infringement-enabling virtues of its 
device; (2) the defendant failed to filter out infringing uses; (3) defendant’s 
business plan depended on a high volume of infringement. In Grokster, all three 
elements were easily demonstrated. The defendants had sent out emails extolling 
P2P copying, and had “aim[ed] to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright 
infringement, the market comprising former Napster users.”22 One of the 
defendants not only declined to devise its own filters; it blocked third-party filters. 
And the defendants’ business plans depended on advertising, whose rates would 
turn on the volume of users encountering the ads. The more the defendants could 
attract visitors, the better for their businesses, and the prospect of free music 
attracts more visitors than paid music. Taken together, these factors demonstrated 
a clear intention to foster infringement. As the Court declared: “The unlawful 
objective is unmistakable.”23  
Of course, inducement to infringe is actionable only if infringements in 
fact occur.24 Because the liability derives from primary infringing conduct, bad 
intent must join with unlawful end-user acts. Thus, for example, distributing a 
copying device together with an exhortation to use the device to engage in massive 
unauthorized copying does not give rise to liability if no one in fact so uses it. In 
Grokster, however, end user infringement was never in doubt; plaintiffs’ studies 
showed that 90% of the works copied were copyrighted,25 and even the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged that the “Copyright Owners assert, without serious contest 
by the Software Distributors, that the vast majority of the files are exchanged 
illegally in violation of copyright law.”26 The Supreme Court thus could exclaim: 
“The probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering.”27 
Having ruled that bad intent, if proved, sufficed to establish liability for 
infringements thus induced, the full Court declined to analyze what the standard 
for contributory infringement would be when intent to foster infringement cannot 
be shown. The full court opinion provided some clues, however, when it stressed 
that certain of the three indicia of intent could not, in isolation, establish 
inducement, because basing liability solely on defendant’s business plan or solely 
on the design of its product would be inconsistent with Sony.28 But the Court 
                                                 
21 545 U.S. at 937. 
22 545 U.S. at 939. See also Sverker Högberg, Note, The Judicial Search for Intent-
Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 909, 952-53 
(2006) (discussing the post-Grokster dangers of targeting a ‘risky demographic.’) 
23 545 U.S. at 940. 
24 Id at 940. 
25 Id. at 922, 933. 
26 380 F.3d at 1160. 
27 545 U.S. at 923. 
28 Id. at 939-40 & n. 12. 
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assiduously declined to offer further guidance on the meaning of “substantial non 
infringing use.” Nonetheless, it may not matter what level of non infringing use 
allows an entrepreneur to enter Sony’s safety zone because the Grokster 
inducement standard may displace inquiries into the substantiality of non 
infringing uses. 29 Speculation is hazardous, but one might predict that where a 
device or service facilitates infringement on a massive scale, its distributor will 
likely be found to have intended that result. Indeed, though intent to facilitate 
infringement by enabling end-user copying supposedly forms the keystone of 
contributory liability, it is not clear whether Grokster’s indicia identify bad intents 
or bad results. In many cases it may be possible to show intent to enable end-user 
copying, but intent to enable end-user copying that is infringing may end up being 
retrospectively assessed based on the volume of infringement that in fact 
transpires.30 In Sony, for example, the VTR manufacturer certainly intended to 
provide the means to tape television programs at home, and even promoted the 
VTR’s utility in building a home library of copied programs (Grokster feature 1); 
it also declined to equip the VTR with a “jammer” to prevent unauthorized 
copying (Grokster feature 2).31 But, on the record in the case, most of the 
unauthorized copying was of a kind (time-shifting and erasure of free broadcast 
television) that a majority of the Supreme Court found non infringing. This 
suggests that size does matter. Where the infringement the device enables is 
relatively modest in scale, inducement will not be found, but neither will the Sony 
threshold for liability be held to have been crossed, whatever its height. In other 
words, “inducement” and “substantial non infringing use” will become legal 
conclusions, separating the Sony (good technology) sheep from the Grokster (evil 
entrepreneur) goats. 32 
                                                 
29 Cf Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright 
Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 
143, 172-77 (2007) (surveying post-Sony caselaw and business practices to show that the 
“merely capable of substantial non infringing use” standard was rarely observed in 
practice).  But see sources cited, supra, note 15. 
30 In fact, at least one court has explicitly concluded that the respective magnitude of 
infringing and non-infringing uses is a factor in determining whether a defendant can be 
held liable for inducement. See Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 
877, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
Moreover, courts may be tempted to infer bad intents from bad results, particularly if 
the defendant has structured its business in order to create “plausible deniability” of an 
intent to facilitate infringement. Cf. Fred von Lohmann, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
“IAAL [I am a Lawyer]: What Peer-to-Peer Developers Need to Know about Copyright 
Law”, § V.7 (December 2003) (http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/p2p_copyright_wp.php) (“Can 
you plausibly deny what your users are up to? . .   Have you built a level of ‘plausible 
deniability’ into your product architecture? If you promote, endorse, or facilitate the use of 
your product for infringing activity, you’re asking for trouble.”). See also Menell & 
Nimmer, supra, 55 UCLA L. Rev. at 148 n. 26. 
31 See Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios: 
Mary Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in Jane C. Ginsburg and Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, eds. Intellectual Property Stories 358, 360-61 (the advertisements), 388-89 
(drawing parallels between plainitiffs’ contentions in Sony and Grokster) (2005). 
32 If liability for contributory infringement ultimately depends on how much 
infringement the device in fact enables, then copyright owners face a quandary noted in the 
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The following analysis supports the speculation. Suppose a distributor, 
culture-for-me.com, offers its users the opportunity to post videoclips to its 
website. Culture-for-me.com neither promotes infringement, nor filters 
infringements out; its business plan aspires to a high volume of traffic to the site. 
In its early days, the website attracted amateur videos, but more recently users 
have also been posting copies of commercial film and television programming. 
Culture-for-me.com’s popularity has risen substantially since professionally-
produced (unauthorized) content began to be found on the site; the traffic to the 
unauthorized user postings is very heavy, indeed, those postings generally (but not 
always) receive more “hits” than the amateur content. 
The most probative Grokster element – promoting the availability of 
infringing content - is absent here. The question thus becomes whether failure to 
filter, plus a business plan that benefits from infringement (although it may not be 
entirely infringement-dependent), suffice to establish inducement. Grokster tells us 
that each of these two in isolation will not demonstrate inducement, but Grokster 
did not explicitly require all three elements to be present before inducement could 
be found.33 Moreover, the distributor of a device or service is not likely to filter if 
                                                                                                                
aftermath of the Sony case. See Douglas G. Baird, Changing Technology and Unchanging 
Doctrine: Sony Corporation v. Universal Studios Inc., 1984 S.Ct. Rev. 237. A suit at the 
outset of a device’s commercialization risks prematurity: the record of infringements may 
be insufficient. But if rights holders wait until a vast amount of infringement can be 
demonstrated, then the public may have come to feel entitled to engage in the copying the 
device enables, and it is difficult for any court to brand the vast majority of American 
households as infringers. Grokster spared the Court that task, because the defendants did not 
contest the “staggering” character of the infringements, and perhaps also because P2P 
filesharing, while widespread, was primarily confined to a discrete (and perhaps 
discreditable) segment of the population – technologically adept adolescents of all ages. On 
the other hand, the pace of digital dissemination today may be so rapid, that the requisite 
“massive” amount of infringement may transpire within the time that normally elapses in 
the pretrial stages of a lawsuit. 
33 Arguably, Grokster’s characterization of inducement as “purposeful, culpable 
expression and conduct,” 545 U.S. at 937 (emphasis supplied), requires not only deeds but 
words.  In Perfect 10 v Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007), a post-Grokster decision 
concerning a search engine’s “in-line” links to sites offering unauthorized copies of 
plaintiff’s “adult” photographs, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s 
holding that the search engine could not be liable if it did not promote the websites to which 
it linked. But the court addressed contributory infringement in the context of facilitating 
known, rather than anticipated, infringements. 
Also, a few courts interpreting Grokster have taken a broader view of inducement 
liability, using analytical frameworks that differ somewhat from Grokter’s three-part test. 
See Monotype Imaging, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (concluding that the 
Seventh Circuit uses a different inducement test, not supplanted by Grokster, which looks to 
whether defendant acted with culpable intent, which is determined based on a balancing of 
three factors: the respective magnitudes of infringing and non-infringing uses, whether the 
defendant encouraged infringing uses, and efforts made by defendant to eliminate or reduce 
infringing uses); AMC Tech., LLC v. SAP AG, C.A. No. 05-CV-4708, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27095, at *16 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (finding that defendant who instructed its customers 
on how to copy plaintiff’s copyrighted computer program is liable for inducement without 
discussing defendant’s business plan or whether defendant had taken steps to prevent 
infringing uses or promoted infringing uses of its product). 
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to do so would reduce its economic benefit.34 In other words, the two go hand-in-
hand. Other Grokster elements prove interdependent as well: a site that does filter 
is not likely to advertise an ability to facilitate infringement if it has in fact 
hampered that capacity. Moreover, a site that does filter will probably not be 
engendering massive infringement. 
If the economy of a culture-for-me.com-type operation depends on 
infringement, it is difficult to see how the entrepreneur could not have intended to 
foster infringement. The district court on remand in Grokster easily equated 
defendant Streamcast’s refusal to filter with its economic self-interest, and thus 
with an intent to induce infringement:  
[A]lthough StreamCast is not required to prevent all the harm that is 
facilitated by the technology, it must at least make a good faith 
attempt to mitigate the massive infringement facilitated by its 
technology. . . . Even if filtering technology does not work perfectly 
and contains negative side effects on usability, the fact that a 
defendant fails to make some effort to mitigate abusive use of its 
technology may still support an inference of intent to encourage 
infringement. . . . StreamCast’s business depended on attracting 
users by providing them with the ability to pirate copyrighted 
content.35 
If profit-motivated failure to filter promotes an inference of intent to 
induce infringement, does implementation of copyright filters warrant the opposite 
inference, of non intent to encourage infringement? My colleague Tim Wu has 
suggested that, while failure to filter may not of itself prove bad intent, the 
entrepreneur who does filter may defeat inferences of intent to induce 
infringement. Filtering therefore may afford a “safe harbor” from future 
inducement claims.36 The recently-announced inter-industry Principles for User 
Generated Content Services adopt the “safe harbor” approach.  The Principles 
recommend pre-upload filtering of content posted to user-generated sites, and also 
advise that copyright owners should not sue cooperating services even if some 
infringing user-generated content remains on the site.37 Thus, whether or not 
                                                 
34The Australian Federal Court in its Kazaa case recognized the probable pairing of 
failure to filter and business interest in infringement, see Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd 
v Sharman License Holdings Ltd. [2005] FCA 1242. 
35 454 F. Supp. 2d 966 (CD Cal. 2006). 
36 See Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox: Understanding Grokster, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
229, 247 (stating that “one might also infer from [the] language [barring liability based 
solely on failure to filter] that Grokster creates a kind of safe harbor that may prove 
important. It may be read to suggest that a product that does filter is presumptively not a 
product that is intended to promote infringement, even if it does, in practice, facilitate 
infringement.”) An early post-Grokster decision appears to bear this out, see Monotype 
Imaging v. Bitstream, 376 F.Supp.2d 877, 888-89 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding no inducement 
because, inter alia, defendant submitted evidence that it had taken steps to avoid the 
infringing use of its compatible type fonts. The court also found that “unlike in Grokster, 
there is no evidence in the record to show that Bitstream’s business was benefited by 
increasing the number of infringing uses of [its product].”).  
37 Supra, note 5, Principle 13. 
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Grokster implies an obligation to filter, businesses who wish to be perceived as 
“legitimate” will have an incentive to avail themselves of filtering technologies.  
On the other hand, if the filter overreacts, and excludes material that is 
not copyright infringing, not only will end-users be likely to take their custom 
elsewhere, but there will be little justification for construing an obligation to filter 
(and the safe harbor will serve little purpose if the customers have gone 
elsewhere). The development of a legal standard would therefore turn on the state 
of the technology: the more reliable and less burdensome the filter, the more likely 
courts are to favor its implementation. For example, in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com 
the Ninth Circuit stated,  
a service provider’s knowing failure to prevent infringing actions could 
be the basis for imposing contributory liability. Under such 
circumstances, intent may be imputed. . . . Applying our test, Google 
could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing 
Perfect 10 images were available using its search engine, could take 
simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10’s copyrighted 
works, and failed to take such steps.38  
Those “simple measures,” however, will need to take account of potential 
fair uses.39 “Teaching” a filter to recognize a parody may not be an obvious 
proposition -- indeed the difficulties of teaching the fair use doctrine to human law 
students might make one less than sanguine about teaching a computer to 
recognize fair uses40 -- and “manual review” by copyright owners and/or internet 
services may be necessary.41 But one can imagine increasing levels of 
                                                 
38 487 F.3d at 728-29 (emphasis supplied).  The simple measures the defendant could 
have taken in Perfect 10 v. CC Bill were, however, probably simpler than those employed 
by a user generated content site.  CC Bill was a linking case, and the measure at issue would 
have terminated the link; by contrast, an on-off switch will not resolve the problems 
associated with user generated content sites because any human or automated filter will 
confront content whose lawfulness is ambiguous.  
39 See, e.g., Principles for User-Generated Content Services, Principle 3(d): “Copyright 
Owners and UGC Services should cooperate to ensure that the Identification Technology is 
implemented in a manner that effectively balances legitimate interests in (1) blocking 
infringing user-uploaded content, (2) allowing wholly original and authorized uploads, and 
(3) accommodating fair use.” Fred von Lohmann has noted two ways that video filtering 
programs can be modified to decrease the chance that they will block fair uses: requiring 
that both the audio and the video of a potentially infringing work match that of a 
copyrighted work before the filter flags the work as infringing, and adding a check to see 
what percentage of the potentially infringing work is made up of coprygihted content. Fred 
von Lohmann, YouTube’s Copyright Filter: New Hurdle for Fair Use? (Oct. 15, 2007), at: 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/10/youtubes-copyright-filter-new-hurdle-fair-use. 
40 See also An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005”. 
University of Pennsylvania Law Revue, Forthcoming Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=998421 (analyzing how courts are in fact applying the four § 107 
factors).. 
41 Principles, supra, Principle 3(f). See also Fair Use Principles for User Generated 
Video Content, supra note 5, Principle 2b “Humans trump machines.” 
A study issued in December 2007 by the Center for Social Media at American 
University, Recut, Reframe, Recycle: Quoting Copyrighted Material in User-Generated 
 13 
sophistication of filters, to recognize, for example, when the uploaded content 
matched by the “identification technology” to a copyrighted work consists entirely 
of the copyrighted content, or instead is composed of excerpts interwoven with 
truly user-generated content (or at least to content that does not match to the 
content which the filter identifies).42 For example, the byte equivalent of the 
apocryphal “250 word” threshold for permissible unauthorized quotations43 might 
be programmed into the filter; similarly, the filter might distinguish between 
overall quantity of content matched between the user-generated upload and a 
copyrighted work (or works), but might let pass matches that are not in sequence 
and therefore might more likely be parodies or remixes.44 The prospect of 
automated fair use might after all not prove as preposterous as first impression 
suggests; at least an automated process might isolate the universe of uploads 
requiring manual review by identifying postings that are clearly infringing 
(complete or near-correspondence to a work on the filter’s black list), and postings 
that are clearly non infringing (no correspondence, or a sub-threshold quantity or 
sequence correspondence to a work on the black list).  
But it will be important to guard against the danger of the negative 
inference. No matter how fair use-tolerant the filter, an excerpt too substantial for 
the filter should not automatically or presumptively be deemed an unfair use.45 As 
                                                                                                                
Video, by Center director Pat Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi, co-director of the Washington 
College of Law’s Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, identifies a 
variety of uses, “satire, parody, negative and positive commentary, discussion-triggers, 
illustration, diaries, archiving and pastiche or collage (remixes and mashups)” which may 
constitute fair uses, see 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/publications/recut_reframe_recycle 
42 Or, in the case of “mashups” (assuming these to be fair use – a potentially 
contentious assumption), small excerpts matched to many identified works. Cf. Fair Use 
Principles for User Generated Video Content, supra note 5, Principle 2.a.3 (video should not 
be blocked unless “90% or more of the challenged content is comprised of a single 
copyrighted work.”)   
43 For text files that don’t include any additional data (such as the codes embedded in 
most word processing documents that describe the document’s margins or fonts), each 
character (meaning letters, spaces, and punctuation marks) constitutes one “byte”. See 
Marshall Brain, How Bits and Bytes Work, at 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/bytes.htm. Thus, a 250 word passage’s byte equivalent 
varies according to the number of letters per word the author uses. To give one example, the 
first 250 words of Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities contain 1,339 bytes, It is 
sometimes said that the average English word contains five letters. See, e.g., Jesper M. 
Johansson, The Great Debates: Pass Phrases vs. Passwords (Nov. 1, 2004), at 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/community/columns/secmgmt/sm1104.mspx. A passage 
with such an average word length and one punctuation mark every five words would 
contain 1549 bytes.  
44 It is conceivable that uploaders could “game” the filter by altering the files in ways 
that to the filter would signal insufficient identity with a protected work, but whose 
alterations would be imperceptible to human viewers.  Such maneuvers, however, suggest a 
level of sophistication and deviousness not representative of most contributors of “user-
generated” content, and therefore may prove more clever than significant.  
45  By the same token, an excerpt that passes the filter should not automatically, as a 
matter of law, be deemed a fair use.  Much depends on how the filter gauges fair use.  For 
example, the Fair Use Principles for User-Generated Video Content, supra note 5, Principle 
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a result, it will be necessary to develop procedures to address the “false positives” 
that a filtering system may inevitably designate. The Fair Use Principles for User 
Generated Video Content promulgated by several public interest groups vigilant of 
perceived copyright-owner enforcement excesses, offer several suggestions. One 
Principle, adopting its own faunal metaphor, proposes a “dolphin hotline” to 
provide an “escape mechanism” for the “fair use ‘dolphins’ [that] are caught in a 
net intended for infringing ‘tuna.’”46 The content owner would set up a procedure 
to receive and respond to user requests for reconsideration of blocked material.47 
Notwithstanding the limitations of filtering systems, it may be fair to say 
that Grokster will have stimulated technology companies to devise ever-more 
effective and sensitive filters; at least the sector has seen renewed activity and 
increased competition since the decision.48 Thus, rather than heralding “ten years 
of chilled innovation,”49 Grokster’s encouragement of copyright-respectful 
technologies suggests that impunity for copyright infringement is not necessary for 
innovation to proceed. 
II. THE STATUTORY NOTICE-AND-TAKE-DOWN SAFE HARBOR 
Contrast the common law outcome with the approach taken in Section 
512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (and arts 12-15 of the 2000 EU 
Electronic Commerce Directive50). There, internet service providers (telecoms) 
successfully lobbied for a large measure of impunity: if the service provider meets 
                                                                                                                
2(a)(3) would set the filter to block only those postings in which “nearly the entirety (e.g, 
90% or more) of the challenged content is comprised of a single copyrighted work.”  
Abundant caselaw, however, establishes that copying of considerably less than 90% of a 
work can defeat a fair use defense.  See generally, Beebe, supra note 40 at [ssrn pp 28-32, 
39, 54-55 PIN when U.Penn. L. Rev. published] (discussing “amount and substantiality” 
factor).  
46 Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, supra note 5, Principle 5. 
47 Id. The Fair Use Principles appear primarily to import the notice and take down 
regime of § 512(c) to user generated content sites, see. Principles 3-6. It is not clear whether 
this constitutes a concession that § 512(c) and related subsections do not otherwise apply to 
user-generated content sites. See discussion infra, Part II. 
48 Examples of recently developed or enhanced filtering technologies include digital 
fingerprinting, a technology that identifies copyrighted content by matching the content’s 
“fingerprints” against the fingerprints of content contained in a library of copyrighted 
works; hashes, which are short files created by a mathematical algorithm that can also be 
used as fingerprints. The current industry leader, using digital fingerprinting technology, is 
Audible Magic; its competitors include Advestigo, Vobil, Grace Note, and in the digital 
hashing filed, Motion DSP. See, e.g., Pirate-Proofing Hollywood, Bus. Wk., June 11, 2007, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_24/b4038073.htm; Peter 
Burrows, Which No-name Startup Is Making a Name for Itself With Hollywood’s Anti-
piracy Police?, Bus. Wk., May 31, 2007, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2007/05/which_no-
name_s.html; Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, New Weapon in Web War Over Piracy, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 19, 2007. 
49 Rob Hof, Larry Lessig: Grokster Decision Will Chill Innovation, Bus. Wk. , June 28, 
2005, available at: 
http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2005/06/larry_lessig_gr.html. 
50 Council Directive 2000/31, art 12-15, 2000, O.J. (L 178), 3. 
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the threshold requirements, it will incur no liability (direct or derivative) for 
monetary damages if it responds expeditiously to a proper notice from the 
copyright holder, and blocks access to the offending material.51 In other words, the 
service provider, if it qualifies, incurs no burden of anticipating or preventing 
infringement52; it need only react to notices of infringements that the copyright 
holders uncover. But absent a pre-upload clearance requirement, one may 
anticipate that at least some of the content the notified service provider takes down 
will promptly reappear, hydra-like, on other hosts’ sites. As a result, it would 
appear that we may have two regimes for internet entrepreneurs: passive reaction 
(“notice-and-take-down”) for qualifying service providers, and proactive 
anticipation (filtering) for everyone else. This would be problematic if those who 
safely grazed in the field of qualifying service providers included not only Sony 
sheep, but Grokster goats. 
While the § 512 regime substantially reduces service providers’ risk of 
liability for acts of direct infringement,53 analysis of the statutory provisions shows 
that an internet entrepreneur whose conduct would expose it to secondary liability 
for copyright infringement should be unlikely to qualify for the statutory 
immunity. The acts to which the immunity attaches are relatively limited in scope, 
and even as to these, the threshold requirements for immunity closely track the 
traditional elements of secondary liability.54 As with the judicial analysis of 
                                                 
51 See 17 USC Section 512(c). 
52 See 17 U.S.C. Section 512(m)(1) (availability of the safe harbor is not 
“condition[ed] on . . . a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts 
indicating infringing activity . . .”). Section 512(i)(1)(B) does make “accommodat[ion of] . . 
. standard technical measures” a prerequisite to qualifying for the statutory safe harbors. 
Arguably, filtering technology might be such a measure. The definition of “standard 
technical measures,” however, suggests that the present state of filtering technologies may 
not suffice, principally because there is not yet an inter-industry concensus regarding the 
design and implementation of filtering measures. See Section 512(i)(2): 
(2) Definition. - As used in this subsection, the term “standard technical 
measures” means technical measures that are used by copyright owners 
to identify or protect copyrighted works and -  
(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright 
owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry 
standards process; 
(B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
terms; and 
(C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial 
burdens on their systems or networks. 
53  Because websites which neither initiate nor intervene in the communication of the 
content nonetheless are engaging in acts of reproduction, distribution and public 
performance or display, even the most passive of hosts could be directly liable for 
infringement absent a derogation such as those established in § 512(c).  See generally Sen. 
Rep. No. 105-190 at 19-21 (1998); Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, (M.D. 
Fla. 1993).   
54 Some courts have, however, interpreted the provisions of Section 512 that 
correspond to the standards for common law vicarious liability somewhat more narrowly 
than had courts construing the same elements in the online context before enactment of the 
DMCA. See discussion infra text at notes [crossreference (93-96)]. 
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derivative liability, the statutory criteria are designed to ensure that the 
beneficiaries of the Section 512(c) safe harbor remain copyright-neutral. Courts 
interpreting Section 512(c) have recognized the neutrality prerequisite:  
This immunity, however, is not presumptive, but granted only to 
“innocent” service providers who can prove they do not have actual 
or constructive knowledge of the infringement, as defined under any 
of the three [threshold requirements] of 17 U.S.C. Section 512(c)(1). 
The DMCA’s protection of an innocent service provider disappears 
at the moment the service provider loses its innocence, i.e., at the 
moment it becomes aware that a third party is using its system to 
infringe.55  
Thus, a disparity between the post-Grokster common law of secondary liability 
and the Section 512(c) system will exist only if the statutory criteria absolved an 
entrepreneur who would have been liable for contributory or vicarious 
infringement at common law.56 
“Service Provider” 
To assess whether the statute creates such a disparity, let us return to 
culture-for-me.com.  It operates a website; is it therefore a “service provider” 
                                                 
55 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001). 
56 The statute in fact contemplates the opposite possibility, that a service provider who 
failed to qualify for the safe harbor might nonetheless be held not to have infringed either 
directly or indirectly, see Section 512(l) (“Other Defenses Not Affected -- The failure of a 
service provider’s conduct to qualify for limitation of liability under this section shall not 
bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by a service provider that the service 
provider’s conduct is not infringing under this title or any other defense.”) See also H.R. 
REP. NO. 105-551, Part 2, at 64 (1998): “Even if a service provider’s activities fall outside 
the limitations on liability specified in the bill, the service provider is not necessarily an 
infringer; liability in these circumstances would be adjudicated based on the doctrines of 
direct, vicarious or contributory liability for infringement as they are articulated in the 
Copyright Act and in the court decisions interpreting and applying that statute, which are 
unchanged by new Section 512. In the event that a service provider does not qualify for the 
limitation on liability, it still may claim all of the defenses available to it under current law. 
New section 512 simply defines the circumstances under which a service provider, as 
defined in this new Section, may enjoy a limitation on liability for copyright infringement.” 
Although the statute and legislative history thus warn against inferring infringement from 
the service provider’s failure to qualify, nonetheless if the statutory criteria closely track the 
common law criteria, it seems likely that a court which has reached one conclusion applying 
the statute could, upon applying the common law standards, arrive at a similar assessment.  
For example, if infringing activity is “apparent” and the service provider does not act to 
remove the infringing material, it will not qualify for the safe harbor, but the copyright 
owner will still need to prove direct or derivative liability.  If the copyright owner brings an 
action based on contributory infringement, the service provider might plead a Sony defense, 
on the ground that the website has non infringing uses.  But the plaintiff would rely on 
Napster to rejoin that the operator is able to shut down the infringing posting, yet preserve 
the non infringing uses.  In other words, the contributory infringement standard may depend 
on whether the technology at issue is a product or a service.  Sony may remain the standard 
for free-standing technologies, but Napster will likely guide analysis of technologies whose 
continuing use the defendant is able to control.  
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within the ambit of the statutory immunity? Section 512’s definition of “service 
provider” is exceedingly vague; the term “means a provider of online services or 
network access or the operator of facilities therefore.”57 “Online services” are not 
defined. In the abstract, the term could mean any services offered online, including 
the service of making copyrighted works available to the public. Or the term could 
mean services specific to being online (other than network access, for which the 
definition specifically provides). Under the first interpretation, anyone who 
operates a website is a “service provider.” Under the second, an entrepreneur who 
hosts a website is a “service provider,” as is one who provides online search 
services; the entrepreneur who makes content available, however, would not be a 
“service provider” because the services provided are not Internet-specific. One can 
provide content from a variety of platforms (e.g., print, broadcast), but one can 
host or link to a website only via the Internet.58  
The case law nonetheless has generally interpreted “service provider” 
extremely broadly, to cover not only Internet-specific businesses, but a variety of 
traditional businesses’ Internet operations, such as online auctions,59 online real 
estate listings,60 and an online pornography age verification service.61 These 
decisions, however, are mostly at the district court level, and none extensively 
analyze the issue.62 Of the two relevant appellate court decisions, one asserted 
without further analysis that the statutory definition of “service provider” was 
broad enough to cover an entrepreneur whose service consisted of a website, a 
server, and peer-to-peer software (but also held that the service did not meet the 
                                                 
57 17 USC Section 512(k)(1)(B). 
58 Section 512(i)(1)(A), which requires qualifying service providers to implement a 
policy for terminating the accounts of repeat infringers, may not cover operators of websites 
to which users post content if the users do not need to subscribe to or have an account with 
the website in order to post material to it. This could suggest that such websites do not 
qualify for the statutory safe harbor.  On the other hand, making ability to terminate the 
accounts of repeat infringers a prerequisite to any “service provider”’s ability to qualify for 
a safe harbor might clash with the §512(d) safe harbor for search engines, because most if 
not all users of search engines access the service without becoming subscribers or account 
holders of the service.  
59 Hendrickson v EBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp.2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (but parties did not 
dispute whether eBay was a “service provider” within the meaning of the statute). 
60 Costar Group v Loopnet, 164 F.Supp.2d 688, 701 (D. Md. 2001) (“‘Online services’ 
is surely broad enough to encompass the type of service provided by LoopNet that is at 
issue here.”) 
61 Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp.2d 1146, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (court 
assumes defendant qualifies as a service provider, but admits that it “has found no 
discussion [in prior caselaw] of this definition’s limits”). 
62 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (stating 
briefly that “Although the Act was not passed with Napster-type services in mind, the 
definition of Internet service provider is broad, and, as the district judge ruled, Aimster fits 
it.”) (citation omitted); Corbis Corp. v Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 
2004) (Amazon’s liability as host to third-party vendors; statutory definition “encompasses 
a broad variety of Internet activities;” court does not inquire into Internet-specificity of 
activities). 
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criteria for the safe harbor).63 Another categorically, but summarily, stated that the 
defendant (a pornography enterprise) in its guise as a website operator could not 
claim the benefit of the statute (although it was entitled to assert those benefits 
with respect to those portions of its business which involved hosting or linking to 
websites).64 
The statute’s legislative history indicates that a “service provider” was not 
intended to embrace every kind of business found on the Internet. The examples of 
service providers given in the House Report consist entirely of enterprises who 
provide “space” for third-party websites and fora, not the operators of the websites 
themselves.65 This makes sense in the context of Religious Technology Center v. 
Netcom On-Line Communication Services,66 the caselaw that Section 512(c) 
substantially codified67: in that case, the service provider defendant was an Internet 
access provider that hosted third party newsgroups, to which another defendant 
had posted documents without the authorization of the Church of Scientology. 
Thus, even if Congress may not have had website operators in mind (much less the 
emerging Web 2.0 businesses), the language it chose to define “service providers” 
may be broad enough to encompass more Internet entities than Congress 
specifically contemplated in 1998. 
“Storage at the direction of a user” 
Assuming, then, that a website operator can be a service provider within 
the meaning of section 512, which of its activities does the statute immunize, and 
subject to what conditions? Section 512(c) absolves a service provider from 
liability “for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of 
a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or 
for the service provider . . .” Is a website, as opposed to a server which hosts 
websites, “a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service 
provider”? If not, the provision would not apply. But a website might be part of a 
system operated by the service provider, so perhaps this element does not screen 
out many actors. More importantly, Section 512 exculpates “storage at the 
direction of a user” (emphasis supplied); it does not suspend liability for other acts 
in which the service provider might engage with respect to the user-posted 
content.68 Additional acts, such as extracting portions of the posted content for 
                                                 
63 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 655; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. VISA Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 
F.3d 788, 795 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding without analysis that VISA and affiliated data 
processing services that processed credit card payments online were not “service 
providers”). 
64 Perfect 10 v. CC Bill, 481 F.3d 751, 768 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). 
65 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, Part 2, at 64 (1998) (“This definition includes, for example, 
services such as providing Internet access, e-mail, chat room and web page hosting 
services.”) See also id. at 53 (describing services covered by Section 512(c): “Examples of 
such storage include providing server space for a user’s web site, for a chatroom, or other 
forum in which material may be posted at the direction of users.”). 
66 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
67 See, e,g, Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
Section12B.01 (2006) (Section 512 “essentially codifies” Netcom).  
68 Cf. Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, (D. Md. 2001) (“The 
legislative history indicates that [the actions protected by Section 512(c) do] not include [the 
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separate performance or display, transferring the posted content to user-selected 
websites, setting up “sharing” networks for the posted content69 may fall outside 
the scope of mere “storage.”  The Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 v. CC Bill,70 came to 
a similar conclusion regarding Section 512(d)’s safe harbor for search engines:  
Even if the hyperlink provided by CCBill could be viewed as an 
“information location tool,” the majority of CCBill’s functions 
would remain outside of the safe harbor of Section 512(d). Section 
512(d) provides safe harbor only for “infringement of copyright by 
reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online 
location containing infringing material or infringing activity.” 
(Emphasis added). Perfect 10 does not claim that CCBill infringed 
its copyrights by providing a hyperlink; rather, Perfect 10 alleges 
infringement through CCBill’s performance of other business 
services for these websites. Even if CCBill’s provision of a 
hyperlink is immune under Section 512(d), CCBill does not receive 
blanket immunity for its other services. 
Let us assume, however, that an entrepreneur like culture-for-me.com is not 
contributing substantial value-added to the user-posted content, so that its liability 
would be based simply on its provision of a site from which users may upload and 
others may download content.71 This conduct comes squarely within the zone of 
the statutory exception. But the exception will not apply unless the entrepreneur 
meets the statutory conditions. A review of these conditions shows their common 
law ancestry: the criteria are very close to the elements of contributory and 
vicarious liability.72  
                                                                                                                
action of uploading] material ‘that resides on the system or network operated by or for the 
service provider through its own acts or decisions and not at the direction of a user.’”) 
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, at 53 (1998)). 
69 See, e.g., Complaint of Viacom Int’l. Inc. in Civil Action 07 CV 2103, Viacom 
Int’l., Inc. v. You Tube Inc., filed SDNY March 13, 2007, ¶¶ 31-33. 
70 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007). 
71 In this respect, culture-for-me.com’s operations differ significantly from those of 
user-generated content sites such as YouTube, whose level of intervention in the 
organization, presentation and communication of the user-posted material has been 
contended to exceed mere “storage,” see http://casedocs.justia.com/new-
york/nysdce/1:2007cv02103/302164/1/0.pdf for Viacom’s complaint, and 
http://casedocs.justia.com/new-york/nysdce/1:2007cv02103/302164/21/0.pdf for 
YouTube’s answer. 
72 See, e.g, II Goldstein on Copyright § 8.3.2 (3d ed. 2005) (“The first of the three 
concurrent conditions for the safe harbor is patterned after the knowledge requirement for 
contributory infringement. . . . The second condition for this safe harbor effectively 
embodies the rules on vicarious liability . . . .”)  
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Statutory Conditions for Limitation on Liability: Knowledge or Awareness 
First, while the service provider has no obligation to monitor the site,73 it 
must neither have actual knowledge that the postings are infringing, nor be “aware 
of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” Once the 
service provider becomes aware of apparent infringements, it must “act[] 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”74 Such awareness 
triggers a proactive obligation to block access in order to qualify for the statutory 
immunity. What constitutes “apparent” infringing activity, then, is key to 
determining whether the safe harbor applies.  
The scanty case law interpreting the statutory “red flag”75 standard at first 
suggests the flag may need to be an immense crimson banner before the service 
provider’s obligation to intervene comes into play. “Although efforts to pin down 
exactly what amounts to knowledge of blatant copyright infringement may be 
difficult, it requires, at a minimum, that a service provider who receives notice of a 
copyright violation be able to tell merely from looking at the user’s activities, 
statements, or conduct that copyright infringement is occurring.”76 Examples of 
conduct sufficiently blatant to warrant the service provider’s vigilance might 
include abnormally and disproportionately high traffic to the area of the site where 
the alleged infringement is located, or the appearance of terms like “pirated” or 
“bootleg” in the name of the file.77 But the context of the website might blur the 
meaning even of file names like “stolen.” In Perfect 10 v. CC Bill, the Ninth 
Circuit declined to find that the titles of pornographic websites that defendant 
hosted, “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com,” should have alerted the 
defendant host server to the copyright-infringing nature of the websites’ content. 
The court observed: “When a website traffics in pictures that are titillating by 
nature, describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to 
increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are 
actually illegal or stolen. We do not place the burden of determining whether 
photographs are actually illegal on a service provider.”78 On the other hand, if the 
file title includes the name of a motion picture, television program, or sound 
                                                 
73 17 U.S.C. § 512(m): “Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the 
applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on -  
(1) a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating 
infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure 
complying with the provisions of subsection (i) . . .” 
74 17 U.S.C. Section 512(c)(1)(A). 
75 See Perfect 10 v CC Bill, supra, 481 F.3d at 763. 
76 Corbis Corp. v Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
77 Id. (citing Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (suspicious 
file names); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (chat groups 
offering instructions on how to engage in illegal downloading); Recording Indus. Ass’n of 
Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (2003) (offering large volume of 
audio or audiovisual files)); cf. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, 
Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (noting that suspiciously low price of records 
might have made it obvious to defendant that they were pirated).  
78 Perfect 10 v CC Bill, 481 F.3d at 763. 
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recording of which the person or entity posting the content is obviously not the 
copyright owner, this may be sufficient to raise a red flag.79 
Of course, not every file name’s incorporation of a film’s title inevitably 
infringes. Some files may in fact be parodies of or other kinds of pastiche or 
commentary on the copyrighted work, and therefore could well be fair use. The 
question is whether the presence of the title should trigger an obligation on the part 
of the service provider to take a look. Any such obligation might be reinforced if 
the titles were the subject of repeated § 512(c) “take down” notices sent by the 
rights holders. In those circumstances, the film’s title might make infringement 
“apparent,” and minimal investigation on the service provider’s part could indicate 
whether in a particular case, appearances deceive.80  In addition, if the film’s title 
correlates to the subscriber information or ip address of an uploader who 
previously posted infringing files,81 the combination of claimed content and 
                                                 
79 Cf. Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (“Without evidence from the site raising a red 
flag, Amazon would not know enough about the photograph, the copyright owner, or the 
user to make a determination that the vendor was engaging in blatant copyright 
infringement.”). 
Cf. Tribunal de grande instance de Paris 3d chamber, 2d section, Judgment of 19 
October 2007, Zadig Productions et autres / Google Inc, Afa, 
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=2072, discussed infra Part III 
(one notice from the copyright owner suffices to shift burden of vigilance to the host 
website).  Accord, Tribunal Commercial de Paris, 8th Chamber, Judgment of 20 February 
2008, Flach Films v. Google Video, http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-
decision.php3?id_article=2223, discussed infra Part III. 
80 Repeated take down notices are likely to result from an automated search of the 
website (or of the Internet as a whole): the search “bot” identifies a file bearing or including 
the name of the copyrighted work, and automatically generates a take-down notice sent to 
the host service provider See generally Public Knowledge: Transcript of Verizon—RIAA 
Subpoena Discussion at National Press Club, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/730 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2008).  Mechanisms of this sort may reduce some of the enforcement 
costs that the § 512(c) regime imposes on copyright owners, although it is not clear that 
individual authors and small independent producers have the means to avail themselves of 
these automated resources.  The clearance burden that § 512 displaces to copyright owners 
thus would fall disproportionately on those least equipped to assume the greater 
enforcement costs.  Automated take-down notices, however, may be problematic if they are 
triggered by nothing more than a file name correlation, for some notices may demand 
removal of postings which could be fair uses.  The Electronic Frontier Foundation has 
initiated actions under § 512(f) alleging that such notices constitute actionable 
misrepresentations.   See, .eg., Complaint Against Geller for Violation of DMCA (N.D. 
Cal) Oct. 2, 2007, available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/sapient_v_geller/geller_complaint.pdf 
   Section 512 requires a showing that the sender “knowingly materially misrepresents 
under this section (1) that the material or activity is infringing.”  One may query whether an 
automated search-and-notify system can give rise to a “knowing” misrepresentation, though 
perhaps one who uses such a system “turns a blind eye” to the possibility that some of the 
postings might be fair use, but this contention’s.  apparent symmetry with the standard for 
contributory infringement seems rather strained. 
81 Section 512(i) requires that service provider adopt and implement a policy for 
terminating subscribers who are “repeat infringers,” but it does not so far appear that the 
prospect of cutting users’ access to the websites to which they post infringing content offers 
 22 
suspect source should deepen the red flag’s hue.  CC Bill notwithstanding, 
“apparent” does not mean “in fact illegal,” nor does it mean “conclusively exists.” 
Such an interpretation would allow the service provider to “turn a blind eye” to 
infringements because the provider could claim that the possibility that some files 
might be fair use means that infringement can never be “apparent” as to any file.82  
By the same token, § 512(m)’s dispensation of service providers from 
“affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity,” should not entitle the 
service provider to remain militantly ignorant. 
Statutory Conditions for Limitation on Liability: Direct Financial Benefit 
Second, the service provider must not “receive a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has 
the right and ability to control such activity.”83 This standard adopts the common 
law test for vicarious liability enunciated in copyright cases involving both 
traditional84 and digital infringement.85 As applied to culture-for-me.com, the 
analysis would focus on how “direct” the benefit of storing user-posted infringing 
content must be to disqualify the website operator, and on the level of control the 
website operator can exercise over the users who post material to the site.  
With respect to the nexus between the infringement and the benefit to the 
website, if the website accepted advertising targeted to the infringing content, the 
benefit would surely be “direct.” Assume, however, that the relationship between 
infringement and the benefit is more attenuated. For example, the website accepts 
advertising; the rates charged are a function of the popularity of the material 
alongside which the ads appear. Or, the website accepts advertising, but the 
advertisements appear randomly; the rates are the same whatever the content in 
connection with which the ads appear. The overall popularity of the website will, 
                                                                                                                
a meaningful remedy, perhaps because terminated subscribers can re-subscribe under other 
names or identifying information, and/or because the statutory standard is unclear: for 
example, must the repeat infringements have been adjudicated?  See Ronald J. Mann and 
Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 16 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
239, 301 (2005) (raising these points with respect to an analogous provision in § 512(a) 
regarding accesss providers). 
82 Cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (stating, with respect to the Section 512(i) requirement, “The Court does not read 
section 512 to endorse business practices that would encourage content providers to turn a 
blind eye to the source of massive copyright infringement while continuing to knowingly 
profit, indirectly or not, from every single one of these same sources until a court orders the 
provider to terminate each individual account.”). 
83 17 U.S.C. Section 512(c)(1)(B). 
84 See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(liability of landlord of flea market at which vendors sold pirated sound recordings. 
85A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2001); Perfect 10 v 
CC Bill, 481 F.3d at 766-67 (common law standards and Section 512(c)(1)(B) standards are 
the same); Costar Group v Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704 (D. Md. 2001), aff’d 373 
F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that “Basically, the DMCA provides no safe harbor for 
vicarious infringement because it codifies both elements of vicarious liability.”). But some 
courts have applied one of the elements of the common law standard for vicarious liability 
more narrowly in the context of Section 512(c)(1)(B); see discussion infra. 
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however, influence the amount of money the website operator can charge for ads. 
If it is true that free (unauthorized) copyrighted content is a “draw,”86 then making 
ad rates turn on the popularity of portions of the website may foster too close a 
relationship between the infringements and the financial benefit.  
By contrast, in the second scenario the financial benefit may be too 
attenuated;87 it might be necessary to show that the presence of free unauthorized 
content makes the site as a whole more attractive than it would be without that 
content. Put another way, the copyright owner may need to show that the free 
unauthorized content is in fact “drawing” users to the site.88 Such a showing may 
imply a significant volume of infringing material,89 although one court has 
declared that what matters “is a causal relationship between the infringing activity 
and any financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless of how substantial the 
benefit is in proportion to a defendant’s overall profits.”90 Comparisons of “before 
and after” visitor rates to websites formerly hosting infringing material can supply 
some indication of the effect of that material on a website’s popularity,91 but it may 
not be appropriate to generalize from one website to another.92 The parties thus 
                                                 
86 See, e.g., Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263 (defendant flea market operator held vicariously 
liable for infringing acts of booths when it received admissions fees, concession stand sales, 
and parking fees that were tied to number of people at flea market); UMG Recordings, Inc. 
v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1002-03 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (increased revenue at concession 
stands and defendant’s on-site go-kart track); Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., 00 
Civ. 4660 (SHS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165, at *35-36 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) 
(“direct financial benefit” prong satisfied when infringing works acted as draw and 
defendant received substantial amount of money from advertising tied to number of users). 
87 Cf. Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. c. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 
262 (D. Neb. 1982) (building company built building based on plaintiff’s architectural 
works without permission, but lumber company and engineer employed by building 
company who received fixed fees for constructing the building held not vicariously liable). 
88 But see Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704-05 (D. Md. 
2001), aff’d. on other grounds, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004) (indirect benefit that 
infringements may provide to a website by “having more files available to customers” “does 
not fit within the plain language of the statute”). 
89 Compare Polygram Int’l Publishing v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1333 
(D. Mass. 1994) (stating that “the crucial question for establishing the benefit prong of the 
test for vicarious liability is not the exact amount of the benefit, but only whether the 
defendant derived a benefit from the infringement that was substantial enough to be 
considered significant” and finding that the benefit was significant even though only four of 
two thousand exhibitors committed infringing acts) with Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed 
Publishing (USA), Inc., 93 Civ. 3428 (JFK), 994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6395, at *16-18 
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2004) (“This Court does not believe that alleged infringements by four 
of 134 exhibitors in any way affected gate receipts at the Show. Plaintiffs offer no evidence 
that so much as a single attendee came to the Show for sake of the music played by four out 
of 134 exhibitors.”).  
90 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). 
91 See Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, New Weapon in Web War Over Piracy, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 19, 2007. (when videosharing site “Guba” implemented filters to screen out 
infringing material, the site’s popularity “took a huge hit”). 
92 Several services provide information regarding web sites’ traffic over a period of 
time. See www.comscore.com; http://siteanalytics.compete.com. But it is unclear whether 
such data can help courts draw reliable conclusions about whether infringing works on a 
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may be locked in a vicious circle: if proving causation requires a “before and after” 
showing with respect to the defendant website, but the “after” data cannot be 
acquired without ordering the website to filter out infringing material, then either 
the copyright owner in effect obtains the requested relief (compelling proactive 
steps on the part of the website) before it has made the required showing, or the 
relief is denied for lack of a showing which cannot be made without ordering the 
website to take the very action it resists. 
Statutory Conditions for Limitation on Liability: Right and Ability to Control 
Infringing Activity 
Even if the “direct financial benefit” standard is met, the service provider 
will not be disqualified from the safe harbor unless it also had the “right and ability 
to control” the infringing activity. Some courts appear to interpret the control 
element differently depending on whether they are applying common law 
principles of vicarious liability, or the Section 512(c) criteria. In the common law 
context, courts will rule that a defendant online service provider has the “right and 
ability to control” an infringing activity if it can block attempts to use its online 
service for infringing activities. 93 By contrast, some courts have found that the 
ability to block access to infringing uses of a website does not of itself mean that 
an online service provider has the “right and ability to control” for the purposes of 
Section 512.94 The rationale for this departure from the common law caselaw 
appears to derive from other aspects of Section 512. Section 512(c)(1)(C) 
conditions qualification for the safe harbor on expeditious removal of the 
infringing content once the service provider is properly notified of its existence. To 
qualify for the statutory exemption, then, the service provider must have the ability 
to block access, at least once the material has been posted. But if the ability to 
                                                                                                                
website acted as a draw. For example, Compete has a measure—”people count”—which 
purports to track how many people visit a website each day. Many of the filtering service 
Audible Magic’s most notable clients did not report a drop in traffic (according to this 
ranking) after announcing a plan to implement its filtering technologies, although other 
entrepreneurs did experience loss of traffic to their sites. The lesson to draw from this 
information is unclear. Perhaps those websites who did not lose audience did not depend on 
infringing materials in the first place. Or perhaps the filtering technology has not been 
effective. Or, even if the technology works as intended, perhaps the websites that saw an 
increase in traffic might have seen an even greater increase had they not implemented the 
filtering technology. Attempts to draw conclusions by comparing sites that do filter with 
those that do not are not likely to be very probative because different levels of traffic may 
result from characteristics of the websites that have nothing to do with filtering. For 
example, it is doubtful that one could reliably attribute Myspace’s slower growth relative to 
its competitor Facebook’s to Myspace’s filtering, when Facebook’s other alleged 
advantages include improved third-party content, different demographic, reduced exposure 
to criticisms regarding stalking and pornography. 
93 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 
1375-76 (N.D. Cal. 1995); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
94 See, e.g., Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704-05 (D. Md. 
2001); Hendrickson v. Ebay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1093-94 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 
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block access also meets part of the standard for disqualification from the 
exemption, then the statute would be incoherent.95  
Thus, in this view, “right and ability to control” under Section 
512(c)(1)(B) must mean something more than a subsequent ability to block access.  
Section 512(c)(1)(B) already sets out an additional element: receipt of a direct 
financial benefit, so perhaps it is not necessary to devise what one might call a 
“common law plus” interpretation of “right and ability to control.”  Alternatively, 
“something more” might mean an ability to intervene before the infringing content 
is placed on the website.96 But this plus factor presents its own anomalies: if the 
service provider must be more closely implicated in the user’s activities in order to 
have the requisite control, then this condition on the safe harbor would be 
redundant: the service provider would already be disqualified on the Section 
512(c)(1)(A) ground that the service thereby acquires forbidden knowledge of the 
user’s activities, or on the Section 512(c) threshold ground that the services it 
provides exceed the mere storage and communication of user-posted content.  
Moreover, it is not clear why recognizing post-hoc ability to block access 
as satisfying the “right and ability to control” prong would in fact make the statute 
incoherent (or, at least, any more incoherent than it arguably already is). It seems 
clear that a Section 512(c) service provider cannot benefit from the safe harbor if it 
sets up a system that disables it from exercising any control over user postings: 
while absence of control would meet the Section 512(c)(1)(B) criterion, the service 
provider would then fail to qualify under Section 512(c)(1)(C) because it would 
not be able to block access to the infringing content. Thus, the inconsistencies of 
the statutory scheme are readily apparent when one considers that the level of 
control requisite to qualifying under (C) might also cause disqualification under 
(B), and that the inability to block access qualifies the service provide under (B), 
but disqualifies it under (C). 
It appears, despite the complexities of Section 512, that the statutory 
prerequisites for application of the safe harbor should sufficiently resemble the 
common law standards of secondary liability that the statute is not likely to herd 
Grokster goat-type businesses together with the Sony sheep. A website that is not 
economically viable without its users’ infringements, or which significantly 
benefits from infringement, should not qualify for the safe harbor. Some 
undesirable mixing may occur among the ovine population, but on the whole, we 
can hope that Internet business practices evolve along some combination of the 
lines proposed in the Principles for User Generated Content Sites and the Fair Use 
Principles for User Generated Video Content, or in the event of litigation, that U.S. 
courts apply the statute in a way that keeps each variety in its proper pen. To 
                                                 
95 Costar Group, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 704 n.9; Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093-94. 
96 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (“Here Cybernet prescreens sites, gives them extensive advice, prohibits the 
proliferation of identical sites, and in the variety of ways mentioned earlier exhibits 
precisely this slightly difficult to define ‘something more.’”); Tur v. Youtube, Inc., CV 06-
4436 FMC (AJWx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50254, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007), 
(“the requirement [of ‘something more’] presupposes some antecedent ability to limit or 
filter copyrighted material”). 
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belabor the agrarian metaphor, do European courts’ constructions of the similar 
criteria set out in the EU eCommerce Directive97 suggest similarly successful 
shepherding?  
III. A CONTINENTAL COMPARISON 
The European Union eCommerce directive provides a framework heavily 
inspired by § 512 of the U.S. Copyright Act. Article 14 allows member States to 
implement a notice-and-takedown regime for services “that consist[] of the storage 
of information provided by a recipient of the service,” subject to conditions 
reminiscent of those contained in § 512(c), including absence of “aware[ness] of 
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent.” 
Article 15 prohibits member States from “imposing a general obligation . . . to 
monitor the information which they . . . store, nor a general obligation actively to 
seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.” The Recitals provide 
additional context to this prohibition. Recital 47 states: “Member States are 
prevented from imposing a monitoring obligation on service providers only with 
respect to obligations of a general nature; this does not concern monitoring 
obligations in a specific case . . .” Recital 48 further specifies: This Directive does 
not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service providers, who 
host information provided by recipients of their service, to apply duties of care, 
which can reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by national 
law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities.” Pre-posting 
filtering may therefore come within the duty of care that member States may 
impose on host services. 
Four recent French decisions concerning user-generated websites, one the 
French version of My Space98, another the “Daily Motion” site99 (sometimes 
referred to as “the French YouTube”), and the other two the Google Video site, 100 
have resulted in monetary and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief based 
on the liability of the social networking website operator. In all four cases, the 
website operators unsuccessfully invoked statutory provisions limiting the liability 
of internet service providers who “stock information furnished by a recipient of the 
service.”101 French law implementing the eCommerce Directive, like its U.S. 
counterpart, limits the liability of qualifying service providers if the service 
providers respond to copyright-owner notices to take down infringing content, or, 
                                                 
97 Council Directive 2000/31, art 14, 2000, O.J. (L 178), 3. 
98 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, decision of 22 June 2007 entering preliminary 
injunction (ordonnance en référée), forthcoming Rev.Int. Dt. D’Auteur (2007). 
99 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, decision of 13 July 2007, entering preliminary 
injunction, forthcoming Rev.Int. Dt. D’Auteur (2007). 
100 Tribunal de grande instance de Paris 3d chamber, 2d section, Judgment of 
19 October 2007, Zadig Productions et autres / Google Inc, Afa, 
http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=2072; Tribunal 
Commercial de Paris, 8th Chamber, Judgment of 20 February 2008, Flach Films v. Google 
Video, http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=2223 
101 See France, Law promoting confidence in the digital economy (LCEN) of June 21, 
2004, art. 6-I, 2° (transposing article 14 1° of the European Directive on electronic 
commerce of June 8 2000). 
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if the infringing character is “apparent,” to intervene of their own accord to block 
access to it. The first-level court in My Space inferred from this definition that only 
service providers who limit their activities to simply storing and communicating 
the user-posted material benefit from the exemption; further participation in the 
presentation or organization of the material casts the service provider in the role of 
a “publisher” and therefore disqualifies the service provider from the liability 
limitation. The court ruled that My Space’s organization of its website to assist 
users in presenting the posted content, and its presentation of profit-generating 
advertisements linked to the user pages exceeded the modest service provider role 
prescribed by the statutory exemption. Rather, these activities converted My Space 
into a publisher, with attendant liabilities for copyright infringement.  
The My Space court followed the host service provider/publisher 
distinction implemented by the Paris Court of Appeals in a case brought by the 
publisher of the Lucky Luke and Blake & Mortimer comic books against the 
French service provider Tiscali.102 One of Tiscali’s subscribers operated a webpage 
offering downloads of full copies of the comic books from its webpage. Tiscali 
asserted the statutory immunity, but the appeals court, reversing the lower court, 
held that Tiscali should be deemed a “publisher,” rather than a mere service 
provider, because Tiscali’s “involvement did not limit itself to simply providing 
technical [storage and communication] services once it proposed to create internet 
users’ webpages . . . Tiscali must be deemed to be a publisher . . . because it offers 
advertisers the opportunity to place paid advertising space directly on subscribers’ 
webpages.”  
The Daily Motion court awarded a preliminary injunction against the 
operator of a user-generated content site, but not on the ground that the service 
provider should be deemed a “publisher” whose involvement in presenting the 
user-generated content exceeded mere storage of user-generated material. The 
court stated that coordinating the placement of advertisements next to user-posted 
material did not justify the “publisher” characterization, because the “essence of 
the publisher’s role is personally to initiate the dissemination” of the content. 
According to the court, personal intervention at the origin of the communication of 
the content justifies the publisher’s liability. The court nonetheless held that Daily 
Motion did not qualify for the statutory exemption because the infringing character 
of the user postings should have been apparent: 
It cannot seriously be claimed that the purpose of the architecture 
and technical means put into place by Daily Motion served only to 
permit anyone and everyone to share his amateur videos with his 
friends or with the community of web users, when these means 
aimed to demonstrate the capacity to offer to the user community 
access to all kinds of videos without distinction [between amateur 
and proprietary content], while all the time leaving it up to users to 
fill up the site under such conditions that it was evident that users 
would do so with copyrighted works, that, as the plaintiffs correctly 
                                                 
102 See Paris Court of Appeals, decision of 7 June 2006, Tiscali Media / Dargaud 
Lombard, Lucky Comics, http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-
decision.php3?id_article=1638  
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point out, the success of the business necessarily supposes the 
dissemination of works known to the public, for only these are of a 
nature to increase the audience and correspondingly to ensure 
advertising revenues . . . Daily Motion must be deemed to have been 
aware at the very least of facts and circumstances that would lead 
one to believe that illicit videos are being posted, that it therefore 
falls to Daily Motion to take responsibility, without passing the fault 
solely onto the users, once the company has deliberately furnished 
the users the means to commit the wrongful act.  
 Although the law does not impose on service providers a 
general obligation to ascertain infringing activities, this limitation 
does not apply when those activities are generated or induced by the 
service provider. 
This decision goes much further than its predecessors, for it seems to 
create an “inducement” exception to the statutory safe harbor. The court perceives 
that the economy of the website depends on the availability of copyrighted works; 
these draw the audience that in turn attracts the advertisers. Although the site did 
not explicitly solicit postings of infringing material, the court found it implausible 
that a site containing only amateur-generated content could be economically 
viable. Thus even if Daily Motion built a facially neutral site, it should have 
anticipated (if it did not in fact intend) that those who would come to the site 
would be seeking copyrighted works, and that other visitors to the site would 
oblige that demand. In this context, the presence of illicit content would be 
“apparent,” and the service provider would not have met the statutory precondition 
that it “not effectively have knowledge of the unlawful character [of the stored 
content] or of facts and circumstances making the illicit character apparent.” 
This approach to what makes infringement “apparent” is much bolder 
than the kinds of “red flags” advanced to rebut the application of Section 512(c) of 
the U.S. copyright act; those arguments tend to be more “retail” in focusing on the 
file name or the level of traffic to the website location. The Daily Motion court’s 
analysis, concentrating on the “architecture” of the website, offers a “wholesale” 
perspective, and one which, while perhaps consistent with economic reality, is a 
rather aggressive reading of the statutory knowledge standard. Under the court’s 
approach, if the “architecture” can be expected to attract infringements, the service 
provider incurs a pro-active obligation to prevent infringement; it may not sit back 
and wait to be notified by the copyright owners. The service provider’s ability to 
anticipate infringement in general (if you build the site, infringers will come) 
becomes tantamount to having effective knowledge of particular “facts and 
circumstances making the illicit character [of the postings] apparent.” 103 
 
                                                 
103 The sense of moral condemnation that appears to inform the Daily Motion court’s 
analysis is consistent with the inducement rationale for secondary liability, but the facts may 
also lend themselves to a “best cost avoider” approach as well.  Compare Yen, supra note 
[x] (comparing fault-based and strict liability-based approaches to contributory 
infringement, and preferring the former), with Mann and Belzley, supra note [y] (proposing 
that liability fall on the party best situated to avoid the occurrence of the harm).. 
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Perhaps because the Daily Motion court’s analysis betrayed more real-
economik than is typical for a French court (or even an American court), the most 
recent decisions offer less venturesome grounds for finding the user-generated site 
service providers “aware” of infringement, and thus disqualified from the statutory 
limitations on liability.  In both cases, liability turned on determining whether and 
when a take-down notice would shift the burden from plaintiff’s obligation to 
notify to the service provider’s obligation to screen out the offending content.  In 
Zadig Prods. v. Google Video, the plaintiff documentary film director found his 
work posted to the Google Video site, and sent a take-down notice.  Google 
responded promptly, but the film reappeared two days later.  The plaintiff sent 
another take-down notice, to which Google responded, but some months later the 
film reappeared a third time.  After the fourth go-around, the plaintiff initiated an 
infringement action against Google.  He asserted that Google should be considered 
a “publisher” unqualified for the liability limitation.  He also contended that even 
if the “service provider” characterization applied, Google could no longer 
passively await notification by the copyright owner; having already been put on 
notice, Google should bear the burden of ensuring against repeat postings.  The 
court rejected the argument that Google was a “publisher:” “that Google Video 
offers the users of its service an architecture and the technical means allowing a 
classification of the contents of the site – services in any event necessary to render 
the content accessible to the public – does not suffice to deem Google a publisher 
when it is a given that the users themselves furnish the content.”  The court then 
held, however, that the first take-down notice alerted Google to the infringement 
not only for the first posting, but for the future.  “Once informed of the illicit 
character of the content at issue by virtue of the first notification, it was up to 
Google to put into place all means necessary to avoid a new posting.  . . . The 
argument that each posting should be deemed a new event requiring a new 
notification must be rejected because, while the successive postings are imputable 
to different users, their content, and the concomitant intellectual property rights, 
are identical.”  One notice thus sufficed to trigger a burden shift to Google to 
prevent future postings of the noticed content. 
Four months later, the Commercial Court of Paris echoed the Zadig 
court’s rulings, awarding damages and a permanent injunction against google 
Video in a case presenting very similar facts.  In Flach Films v Google Video, The 
owner of the French videostreaming rights in a documentary, “Le Monde Selon 
Bush” (“The World According to Bush”), discovered on the Google Video site 
three unauthorized links to free streams or downloads of the film.  The right owner 
sent a take-down notice to Google Video on October 6, 2006.  Google replied on 
October 10 that it had disabled the three links.  Plaintiff proved, however, that one 
of the three links was back up on the Google Video site on October 17, and that 
more links were accessible on November 7, 13 and 14, 2006, as well as on March 
30, April 10 and May 15,2007.  The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that Google 
Video was a “publisher”; nonetheless, the Court ruled that Google Video, albeit a 
“host service provider,” was liable for hosting unauthorized video content posted 
after October 10: 
Whereas as of that date it was up to Google Video to render access to the 
film impossible, and this evidently was not done and has harmed the 
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rights of third parties, Google Video cannot avail itself of the [statutory] 
limitation on liability, with regard to facts proven to have occurred after 
October 10, 2006 concerning the dissemination of the same content. 
Whereas the defendants cannot demonstrate any technical impossibility in 
exercising the necessary supervision [of its site], the defendants have in 
fact demonstrated that there exist increasingly sophisticated means that 
allow them to identify illicit content, and that they implement these means 
to eliminate child pornography, apologia for crimes against humanity, and 
incitements to hatred  
 The two Google Video judgments concur that “awareness” attaches with 
the first take-down notice.  As a practical matter, these decisions instruct user-
generated content sites to create a black list: once a site receives the first take-
down notice, it should not only remove the noticed content, but add the identifying 
information to a filter that will block future postings of the same content. 
Underlying all the statutory safe harbor cases, whether French or 
American, is the policy issue of which party should bear the burden of ascertaining 
and preventing infringement: the copyright owner, or the entrepreneur who 
allegedly attracts and benefits from the infringements. The safe harbors remove 
pre-clearance of user postings from the costs of doing business as a service 
provider, but this may assume that the copyright owner is better situated to 
discover infringements than is the service provider.  As Zadig Productions 
illustrates, however, when the copyright owner is an individual creator, the burden 
of monitoring and notifying can be significant, especially if the creator must 
forever keep monitoring sites already alerted to past infringements of the same 
material.  The relative resources of the documentary filmmaker and of Google may 
have supplied an unspoken reason for the court to shift the burden to the service 
provider after the initial take-down notice.  Flach Films generalizes the 
proposition; albeit not an industry giant, the plaintiff there was not an individual 
filmmaker, but Zadig Productions’ “one strike” approach still prevailed. 
Allocating the clearance burden at least initially to copyright owners also 
assumes that the service provider’s business is not built on or does not specifically 
benefit from infringement. Daily Motion tightens the nexus between providing 
services and fostering infringement in a way that shifts the inquiry from the service 
provider’s specific wrongful acts to the generalized risk its service creates of 
promoting infringement.104 As a practical matter, in light of the kind of filtering 
technology evoked in Flach Films, the pre-clearance task may be far less onerous 
than the US Congress in 1998 and the EU Commission in 2000 may have 
expected. As a result, technological evolution may be in the process of discrediting 
the premises of the copyright owner-service provider balance struck in the DMCA 
and in the eCommerce Directive; at least this evolution raises the question whether 
these statutory schemes leave room for some reallocation of the enforcement 
burden. The kinds of filtering practices proposed in the Principles for User 
                                                 
104 I owe this observation to Professor Pierre Sirinelli, whose commentary on Daily 
Motion and MySpace appear in a forthcoming issue of the Revue Internationale du Droit 
d’Auteur (RIDA). 
 31 
Generated Content Services undertake the burden-shift voluntarily (albeit in the 
shadow of the Viacom-Google litigation). It remains to be seen whether more 
national courts determine that the text, albeit perhaps rooted in a bygone 
technological moment, permits the kinds of recalibration the Daily Motion and 
(somewhat less radically) Zadig Prods. and Flach Films courts undertook. 
CONCLUSION  
Common law standards, and the statutory criteria of the U.S. service 
provider safe harbors, condition the imposition of derivative liability on a fairly 
close correspondence between the challenged business models and the 
infringements they allegedly spawn. To return to the much-abused agricultural 
metaphor, the Grokster goats are those entrepreneurs who either intentionally 
foster infringements, or who continue to benefit from infringements once they 
learn of their occurrence - or once their occurrence should have been apparent - 
and take no reasonably available steps to avoid them. Daily Motion may reinterpret 
“apparent” to mean “reasonably anticipatable,” and the Google Video decisions 
hold infringement “apparent” after a single notice.  Both thus more readily shift to 
the Internet entrepreneurs the burden of preventing infringement. Under the Sony 
standard, the mere ability to anticipate that the technology will cause some 
infringement (without a concomitant capacity to prevent specific infringements) 
does not suffice to establish contributory infringement105 (though one might query 
whether the ability to anticipate that the technology will cause massive 
infringement removes the technology from the Sony shelter to the Grokster 
standard106). From an Internet entrepreneur’s perspective, the French decisions 
may be reclassifying too many sheep as goats. From a copyright owner’s point of 
view, it remains to be seen whether, if the Daily Motion or Google Video 
approaches take hold in Europe, they prove the more adept at animal husbandry 
because they are better able to discern a goat in sheep’s clothing. 
 
                                                 
105 See supra notes 11-143. 
106 Arguably, that capacity may be incipient in every Web 2.0 business; it all depends 
whether the business turns out to be extremely successful. 
